



According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, a belief is 
justified when it is our obligation or duty as rational creatures to believe it. 
However, this view faces an important objection according to which we cannot have 
such epistemic obligations since our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. 
One possible strategy against this argument is to show that we do have voluntary 
control over some of our beliefs, and that we therefore have epistemic obligations. 
This is what I call the voluntarist strategy. I examine it and argue that it is not 
promising. I show how the voluntarist attempts of Carl Ginet and Brian 
Weatherson fail, and conclude that it would be more fruitful for deontologists to 
look for a different strategy. 
1. Epistemic Deontologism 
It is commonly admitted that the concept of epistemic 
justification is a normative one. To say that a belief is justified is to 
appraise it. We make a favorable judgment towards it because it is a 
good means to the end of acquiring knowledge and seeking truth. 
Conversely, an unjustified belief is not a good belief since it is not 
likely to serve the goal of seeking truth.1 Given that, some say we 
should define epistemic justification in deontic terms, i.e., in terms of 
______________ 
* L’auteur est étudiant à la maîtrise en philosophie (Université de Montréal). 
1 The idea of believing truly as our primary epistemic goal is itself a 
contested claim. See for example the exchange between Jonathan Kvanvig 
and Marian David in Steup and Sosa (2005). However, I shall leave this 




‘duty’, ‘obligation’, ‘permission’, ‘responsibility’, ‘praiseworthiness’, 
‘requirement’, etc. Laurence BonJour for example writes:  
the concept of epistemic justification is fundamentally a 
normative concept. It has to do with what one has a 
duty or obligation to do, from an epistemic or 
intellectual standpoint. As Chisholm suggests, one’s 
purely intellectual duty is to accept beliefs that are true, 
or likely to be true, and reject beliefs that are false, or 
likely to be false. To accept beliefs on some other basis 
is to violate one’s epistemic duty – to be, epistemically 
irresponsible – even though such acceptance might be 
desirable or even mandatory from some other, non-
epistemic standpoint. (BonJour 1980, 55) 
I shall call this view deontologism and its proponents deontologists. As 
Matthias Steup defines it, deontologism is the claim that, “S is 
justified in believing p if and only if S believes p and it is not S’s duty 
to refrain from believing p.” (Steup 1996, 74) In other words, when a 
belief is justified, it means that believing it is ‘responsible’, 
‘praiseworthy’, ‘permitted’ and even ‘required’. It is an epistemic 
‘duty’ or ‘obligation’ given our goal, as rational creatures, of seeking 
knowledge and truth. 
BonJour’s case against externalism about justification (BonJour 
1980) is a good example of a deontological use of the concept of 
epistemic justification. BonJour claims, roughly, that externalism 
violates a deep intuition that we have concerning justification, namely, 
that it does not seem possible for a person to accept a belief 
irrationally (irresponsibly), and still be epistemically justified. He gives 
a series of examples in which an agent believes p despite having far 
better reasons for believing ¬p. The thing is that in these examples, p 
is in fact true. The reasons available to the agents are simply 
misleading. But since they did not take their reasons into account, 
they ended up having true beliefs. BonJour’s claim is that, even if they 
are true, these beliefs are not justified since they were formed 
‘irresponsibly’ or ‘irrationally’. Being epistemically responsible implies 
taking reasons into consideration. It is our duty to do so because it is 




This is not to say that our duty consists in acquiring true beliefs. Such 
beliefs are only our end from an intellectual standpoint. Our 
obligation consists rather in employing the best method for achieving 
that goal, and this method is to believe what we have most reasons to 
believe. This means that in some cases in which we only have access 
to very misleading evidence, it will be our duty to believe something 
false. This is the case of the protagonists in BonJour’s cases. They are 
irresponsible and blameworthy because they fail to take their reasons 
into consideration.  
Such a deontic construal of epistemic justification has a certain 
intuitive plausibility. As William P. Alston writes, it is reflected in our 
ordinary epistemic talk: 
There are many locutions that encourage us to think of 
believing as subject to requirement, prohibition, and 
permission. We say “You shouldn't have supposed so 
readily that he wouldn't come through”, “You have no 
right to assume that”, “I had every right to think that 
she was honest”, “I ought to have given him the benefit 
of the doubt”, and “You shouldn't jump to 
conclusions”. (Alston 1988, 260) 
However, despite its intuitive appeal, deontologism is not immune 
to objections. One of them is what I shall call the argument from 
doxastic involuntarism. 
2. The Argument from Doxastic Involuntarism 
According to deontologism, we have epistemic obligations. We 
have, as rational beings, the responsibility to believe certain things. If 
we fail to believe what we ought to, then we are blameworthy. The 
use of concepts such as obligations, blame and responsibility suggests 
a close connection between epistemology and ethics. Roderick 
Chisholm – a prominent contemporary deontologist – explicitly 




The chief problems of perception are conceived by 
Chisholm, in the traditional way, to be problems 
concerning the justification of perceptual judgments. […] 
For Chisholm, however, all such questions are questions 
of ethics, for to ask whether a judgment is justified, or 
whether we have adequate evidence for it, is simply to 
ask whether it is worthy of our belief. Epistemology is 
thus to be construed, in large part, as the ethics of belief.  
(Firth 1959, 493-294) 
This idea of a close relationship between ethics and epistemic 
justification is getting more and more attention on the ethics side as 
well. Terence Cuneo (Cuneo 2007) recently made a case for it in 
order to defend the existence of independent moral facts. According 
to him, moral and epistemic requirements are deeply similar. Some 
obligations – like that of treating the testimony of others with 
sufficient care and attention – even seem to be both moral and 
epistemic. (Cuneo 2007, 80)  Thus according to him, “there are close 
parallels between moral and epistemic facts – so close in fact, that the 
moral and epistemic domains are helpfully viewed as overlapping and 
interpenetrating in various ways.” (Cuneo 2007, 88)  
However, if we accept this similarity, then we have to accept 
another similarity that turns out to be problematic for deontologism. 
Take a fairly uncontroversial moral obligation such as that of not 
hurting people for fun. Suppose I voluntarily step on the foot of an old 
lady for fun. I could refrain from doing it but I do it anyway. I just 
want to hurt her. Moral luck and free will considerations aside, it 
seems right in that context to blame me for that action because I was 
responsible for doing it. I could have done otherwise. Alternatively, 
suppose one of my friends pushes me and causes me to step on the 
old lady’s foot. I still hurt her. But this time, it was involuntary. I am 
clearly not responsible for what happened because I had no control 
over the event. For that reason, it does not seem right to blame me. It 
seems then that I cannot be blamed and held responsible for 
something I could not refrain from doing. This derives from Kant’s 
famous principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (OC). Sharon Ryan states 
the principle as follows: “If person S has an obligation to do A at 




latter example, I did not violate the moral ought of refraining from 
hurting innocent people since I could not refrain from doing it at that 
time. My friend pushed me so I had no voluntary control over the 
event. Hence I cannot be blamed for it. 
Back to epistemology, if we agree with deontologism and define 
epistemic justification in terms of obligations and responsibility, then 
OC applies there too. Epistemic obligations are still obligations, viz., 
obligations to believe certain things. So following OC, if we have an 
epistemic obligation to believe p at time t, then we are able to believe 
p voluntarily at t.  Therefore, just as I cannot be blamed for stepping 
on the lady’s foot in the latter case, it seems that I cannot be blamed 
for believing something I could not refrain from believing. Steup 
labels this the voluntariness principle: “If my believing p is involuntary, 
then I can’t have an epistemic duty to believe p nor an epistemic duty 
to refrain from believing p.” (Steup 1996, 75)  
The plausibility of this principle has led many philosophers such as 
William P. Alston (Alston 1985, 1988) and Alvin Plantinga (Plantinga 
1993) to raise an important objection against deontologism. As Richard 
Feldman writes: “A central problem that both Plantinga and Alston find 
with deontological judgments about beliefs is that they presuppose that 
we have voluntary control over what we believe. Yet reflection on our 
mental lives suggests that we have no such control.” (Feldman 2001, 78) 
According to these authors, the voluntariness principle is true. But the 
problem is that our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. 
Believing something seems to be always involuntary. All cases of 
believing look analogous to the second old lady case. I shall refer to the 
thesis that we do not have voluntary control over any of our beliefs as 
doxastic involuntarism. But if doxastic involuntarism and the voluntariness 
principle are both true, then we do not have any epistemic obligations, 
and deontologism is thus false. Here is a schematic formulation of this 
argument in the terms of Ryan’s OC and Steup’s voluntariness principle. 
I shall label it ‘ADI’, i.e., the argument from doxastic involuntarism: 
(1) If we have any epistemic duties, then our beliefs must 
sometimes be under our voluntary control.  
(2) Our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. 





Premise (1) is an epistemic version of OC, premise (2) is doxastic 
involuntarism, and (3) is the conclusion implying that deontologism is 
false. Thus stated, (2) is quite vague however. For one thing, what 
does it mean to say that something is not under our voluntary 
control? Because of its simplicity and its intuitive plausibility, I shall 
follow Steup’s definition of involuntariness: “S believes p 
involuntarily if and only if S believes p and S cannot refrain from 
believing p” (Steup 1996, 74). That being said, a further clarification 
of (2) is needed. An important distinction has to be made concerning 
doxastic involuntarism, and it will turn out to be crucial. 
3. Two Interpretations of Voluntarism and ADI 
Although we know what ‘being able to refrain from’ means, it is 
not clear what it is that doxastic involuntarism says we cannot refrain 
from doing. Premise (2) of ADI denies voluntarism about beliefs, that 
is, the claim that our beliefs are sometimes under our voluntary 
control. But what does it mean to say that our beliefs are not ‘under 
our voluntary control’ or that we ‘cannot refrain from believing p’? 
Voluntarism can be interpreted in two ways. It can mean either being 
able to refrain from (A) causing the forming of a belief, or (B) forming a 
belief. Of course, these two concepts are still very vague. So here is a 
paradigmatic example that will illustrate what I take them to mean 
and how they differ. 
Suppose you enter a room where the lights are off and you want 
to believe that they are on. There are at least two conceivable ways in 
which you can achieve that goal. The first is simply to turn the lights 
on. The lights will thus be on and you will see it. Then as a result of 
seeing it, you will start believing that they are on. Your voluntary 
action of turning the lights on thus causes your forming the belief 
that they are on. That would be a case of what I called (A) ‘voluntarily 
causing the forming of a belief’. In other words, a case of doing 
something that will make you believe what you want to believe. This 
is a possible understanding of voluntarism because it is a sense in 
which you can say that your belief is under your voluntary control. 
Had you decided to leave the lights off, you would not have believed 




you could have refrained from causing you to believe that they are on. 
This is, in a way, to have control over your belief. 
The second possible meaning of voluntarism, i.e., of exercising 
voluntary control over your belief, is more direct. Suppose you want 
to believe that the lights are on. But instead of turning the lights on 
again, you leave them off, and simply start believing that they are on, 
despite the evidence. Instead of merely doing something that will 
cause the forming of that belief, you directly and voluntarily form that 
belief. That would be a case of what I called (B) ‘voluntarily forming a 
belief’. This is another possible interpretation of voluntarism about 
belief. It is another conceivable sense in which you are exercising 
voluntary control over your belief. In the example, you could have 
refrained from forming the belief that the lights are on.  
These two interpretations of voluntarism entail two different 
interpretations of ADI. In both cases, it is plausible to say that, in 
some sense, I voluntarily believe that the lights are on. But it is clear 
that these two types of voluntarism do not share the same intuitive 
plausibility. As the second part of the lights example shows, (B) 
(voluntarily forming a belief) is very hard to imagine. The situation 
described in the example is quite implausible. Intuitively, it does seem 
that as long as we see that the lights are off, we cannot help believing 
that they are off. Once we are aware of evidence showing that p, it 
seems beyond our capacity to sincerely believe ¬p. As Alvin Plantinga 
writes: “You offer me a million dollars to believe that the population 
of the United States exceeds that of China; I can try my hardest, 
strain to the uttermost; it will be in vain.” (Plantinga 1993, 24) In 
contrast, the triviality of the first lights example shows that (A) is 
obviously possible. There are many things I can voluntarily do that 
will make me believe something.  
So on the one hand we have (A) which is obviously possible, and 
on the other we have (B) which, on the face of it, looks impossible. 
Therefore, I claim that if the argument from doxastic involuntarism 
(ADI) is to have any strength whatsoever, it cannot understand (2) in 
terms of (A). More schematically, the argument is toothless if it 





(1*) If we have epistemic duties, then we must sometimes be able 
to voluntarily cause the forming of our beliefs, i.e., to do (A). 
(2*) We are never able to voluntarily cause the forming of our 
beliefs. 
(3) We do not have any epistemic duties. 
 
As I said, (2*) is obviously false. It is shown by the first part of the 
lights example. Hence if ADI means ADI*, then ADI is obviously 
unsound. The only way ADI will have any force then is if it 
understands (2) in terms of (B) instead. More schematically, the 
argument is toothless unless it means what I shall call ADI**: 
 
(1**) If we have any epistemic duties, then we must sometimes be 
able to voluntarily form our beliefs, i.e., to do (B) 
(2**) We are never able to voluntarily form our beliefs. 
(3) We do not have any epistemic duties.  
 
As I said, the falsity of (2**) is not obvious at all. ADI** thus 
seems a lot more convincing than ADI*. Therefore, if we apply some 
sort of principle of charity in our interpretation of ADI, then ADI** 
is a much better candidate than ADI* for being what ADI means. To 
put it another way, attacking ADI by refuting only ADI* would be a 
straw man fallacy. If this is true, then we have a criterion for a good 
objection against ADI: any good objection against ADI will have to be an 
objection against ADI** and not merely against ADI*.  
4. The Voluntarist Strategy: Two Attempts 
Deontologists then have the choice between at least two strategies 
against ADI**. First they can reject premise (1**) and claim that we 
have epistemic obligations despite not being able to voluntarily form 
our beliefs. Or they can reject premise (2**) instead and claim that we 
are sometimes able to voluntarily form our beliefs. I shall call the 
latter option the voluntarist strategy. There are at least two major 
examples of voluntarist replies in the recent literature: the one 
proposed by Carl Ginet (2001) and the one from Brian Weatherson 
(2008). My general claim in this section is that in light of the criterion 




refuting ADI**. Both proceed by giving a series of hypothetical cases 
that are supposed to show that premise (2) is false. Given the 
distinction between (A) causing the forming of a belief, and (B) 
forming a belief, I want to show that these alleged counter-examples 
can all be described as mere cases of (A). However, according to my 
criterion, it is examples of (B) that are required. Only they can falsify 
(2**) and hence refute ADI** (which is the criterion for being a good 
objection against ADI). My argument is that if an alleged counter-
example to (2) can be convincingly described as a mere case of (A), 
then it is not really a counter-example to (2) since it is not a counter-
example to (2**). But as a matter of fact, all of them can be thus 
described. Therefore I conclude that none of the cases succeeds in 
refuting ADI. 
The first two cases are from Ginet (2001). According to him, we 
can clearly observe people “coming to believe something just by 
deciding to do so” (Ginet 2001, 63). Despite what the involuntarists 
say, our everyday experience is full of situations where we seem to be 
displaying this ability. Therefore it is false to say that our beliefs are 
never under our voluntary control. To show this, Ginet starts by 
giving two examples of people deliberating over believing p or ¬p, 
and then deciding to believe one rather than the other. 
Case #1: Sam is on the jury of a trial. He has to decide whether the 
accused is guilty or not. He hears the testimony of a witness and 
realizes that if what the witness says is true, then the defendant 
cannot be guilty. Therefore, Sam has to decide whether he should 
believe the witness or not. After deliberation, he decides to believe 
that what the witness said was true. Thus he claims that the accused is 
not guilty. (Ginet 2001, 64)  
Case #2: Sue is in a poker game and she is the only one besides 
Hank who has not folded. She has a very good hand and she is 
convinced she will win. But then, Hank raises by a large sum, even 
though it is almost impossible that he has better cards. Now she has 
to choose between believing that Hank is bluffing and believing that 
he is not. On the one hand, he seems very nervous so he could very 
well be bluffing. But on the other, he could be faking it in order to 
make Sue believe that he is bluffing, and thus make her bet more. 




done such a thing. Sue knows him to be a very bad liar. Therefore, 
she decides to believe that he is in fact bluffing, and that he is just 
nervous about bluffing, so she meets his raise. (Ginet 2001, 64) 
Reply to cases #1 and #2: According to Ginet, Sam and Sue 
voluntarily decide to believe one thing rather than another. But in 
what sense? Do they form a belief directly or do they merely cause 
the forming of a certain belief? The latter description is more 
appropriate. What they do voluntarily (and hence what they could 
have refrained from doing) is the deliberation. They decide to 
examine the evidence to which they have access, and they come to 
see which option is the most consistent with the evidence. Then, the 
outcome of this deliberation causes the forming of a certain belief. 
Sam voluntarily compares the reasons there are to believe that the 
witness is telling the truth, with the reasons to believe that he is lying. 
Sue voluntarily compares the reasons to believe that Hank is bluffing, 
with the reasons to believe that he is not. When it becomes clear what 
the pros and cons are, one option turns out to have more reasons on 
its side than the other. As a consequence of realizing that there are more 
reasons to believe p rather than ¬p, they come to believe p. As soon 
as they see that the evidence obviously points toward p, they cannot 
help believing p. The only way they could believe ¬p would be to 
reexamine the evidence more carefully. Maybe then ¬p would appear 
more plausible after all. In that case, they would come to believe ¬p, 
not because they decided to form the belief that ¬p, but because they 
decided to reexamine the evidence. If we go back to the example of 
the lights, the outcome of your (voluntarily) turning the lights on is 
the lights being on. As soon as you become aware of that outcome, 
you cannot help believing that the lights are on. The same happens to 
Sam and Sue. The outcome of their voluntarily examining the 
evidence is that one option appears to be more convincing than the 
other. As soon as they become aware of that outcome, they cannot 
help believing that option rather than the other. Cases 1 and 2 are 
thus examples of voluntarily causing the forming of a belief rather 
than examples of voluntarily forming a belief. They falsify (2*) but 
not (2**). Therefore, contrary to what Ginet claims, they do not 
refute ADI. 
The next two cases are also from Ginet but they are slightly 




things for practical or pragmatic considerations, i.e., because it is 
more convenient or because it serves their personal interest. That 
shows, according to Ginet, that we have voluntary control over our 
beliefs. 
Case #3: Earlier today, Sue asked Sam to bring her a book from 
his office. She absolutely needs that book. But now she is worried 
because Sam has often forgotten such things in the past and she 
wonders if he will remember this time. However, Sue thinks that it 
would cause too much inconvenience to get in touch with him, and 
interrupt his work. Furthermore, spending all day wondering whether 
he’ll remember will make her too anxious. For all these reasons, she 
decides to stop worrying, and believe that he will remember to bring 
the book. (Ginet 2001, 64) 
Case #4: Carl and his wife leave for a road trip. They are 50 miles 
from home when Carl’s wife asks him if he locked the front door. At 
first he thinks that he did but he starts to doubt. He realizes that his 
memory of his locking the door is not clear at all. He might have 
forgotten. However, it would be a great inconvenience to turn back 
and verify. It would also be an inconvenience to keep worrying about 
it. For these reasons, he decides to believe that he locked it. (Ginet 
2001, 64)  
Reply to cases #3 and #4: There seems to be two possible 
interpretations of 3 and 4. The first is to see them as the opposite of 1 
and 2. That is, instead of deciding to examine carefully the evidence 
and deliberate, Sue and Carl voluntarily refrain from deliberating. For 
pragmatic reasons, they decide to be epistemically irresponsible. They 
decide to refrain from examining carefully the evidence that they 
have. They avoid reflection and stick with the reasons that support 
the most convenient belief p. Instead of seeking truth, they seek the 
satisfaction of their own interest. They choose to pay attention only 
to the reasons that support p, or at least they give an unfair 
consideration to the reasons that support ¬p. The outcome of that 
phony deliberation is obviously that p seems much more plausible 
than ¬p. So, recalling the lights example, the outcome of your 
(voluntarily) turning the lights on is the lights being on. As soon as 
you become aware of that outcome, you cannot help believing that 




aware that p is plausible (this being the outcome of the phony 
deliberation), they consequently form the belief that p. They cannot 
avoid forming it. What they could have avoided (hence what is 
voluntary) is the partial examination of reasons. The formation of the 
belief that p is the consequence, while the phony deliberation is the 
cause. On this first interpretation, cases 3 and 4 are therefore cases of 
(A) voluntarily causing the forming of a belief rather than examples 
of (B) voluntarily forming a belief. Hence they do not falsify (2**), 
and do not count against ADI. 
The second possible interpretation of 3 and 4 is more 
straightforward and even more threatening to the relevance of those 
examples for deontologism. It is to say that Sue and Carl do not 
actually believe what Ginet claims they decided to believe. On this 
alternative interpretation, even though Sue says she believes that Sam 
will remember to bring her book, this is not what she actually 
believes. In the same way, even though Carl says he believes that he 
locked his door, this is not what he actually believes. They may 
believe that they believe the convenient belief p but this is unjustified 
and false. After all, what reasons do they have to believe that they 
believe p? They have much more reasons to believe that they believe 
¬p; namely that they are aware of good reasons to believe ¬p. If this 
is right, then not only cases 3 and 4 are not cases of (B), but they are 
not even cases of (A). Since Sue and Carl do not really believe p, they 
are not even causing the forming of a belief. Hence 3 and 4 falsify 
neither (2*) nor (2**). This interpretation therefore makes these cases 
even more useless for defending deontologism. No matter which of 
the two interpretations is right, they both conclude that 3 and 4 do 
not falsify (2**). Hence it seems fair to conclude that they do not 
count against ADI. 
The next two cases from Brian Weatherson (Weatherson 2008) 
display a different feature. We often make mistakes and form false 
beliefs. In many of these cases, there is nothing we could have done 
to avoid the error. In some other situations however, we could have 
avoided the mistake by being more epistemically careful. For 
Weatherson, there are skills at being a believer, and we can use those 
skills voluntarily through self-control. He gives two examples in 
which a lack of such skills is involved. In the first example, the agent 




agent takes an unrealistic hypothesis too seriously. In both cases, 
Weatherson claims, the agent could have done otherwise: he could 
have formed his beliefs in a more skillful way. Since he could have 
done otherwise, he does have voluntary control over some of his 
beliefs. Hence we do have epistemic obligations.  
Case #5: Mark has to get the groceries this week for him and his 
roommates. He looks in the fridge and sees a carton of orange juice. 
Consequently, he forms the belief that there is still orange juice left 
and he infers that he does not have to buy any. So he gets the 
groceries and does not buy any orange juice. But as a matter of fact, 
his belief is false. There is no orange juice left. There is indeed a 
carton in the fridge, but it is empty. It was put there by one of his 
roommates. When Mark finds that out, not only is he angry with his 
roommate, but he is also angry with himself. Inferring the presence of 
orange juice from the sole presence of a carton was epistemically 
careless. Given the character of his roommates, the possibility of the 
carton being empty in the fridge was a live one. Forming the belief 
that there was orange juice left on the sole basis of the presence of a 
carton in the fridge was hasty. But he could have avoided forming 
that false belief. How? By considering all of the live possibilities given 
the evidence. Since the carton being empty in the fridge was among 
the live possibilities, he could have avoided forming his false belief if 
he had exercised self-control, and considered all the realistic 
possibilities. This is something he could have done voluntarily. But if 
Mark could have avoided forming the belief that there was orange 
juice left, then he had voluntary control over this belief. (Weatherson 
2008, 552-554) 
Case #6: Mark is watching his favorite football team and they are 
losing by a very large margin. His team is very bad and there is not 
much time left in the game. His roommates are going to watch a 
movie but Mark does not want to come with them. He wants to keep 
watching the game because he believes his team might come back. 
However one of his friends shows him that his belief is ridiculous. 
Even if a comeback is possible in principle, it is highly implausible. 
That convinces Mark who then changes his mind and forms the 




Reply to cases #5 and #6: Weatherson claims that in both cases, 
Mark could have exercised self-control in order to be more 
epistemically responsible and skillful. It was within reach. If he had 
done that, he would have had better beliefs. Hence in a sense, he 
could have refrained from believing falsely. Therefore, our beliefs are 
sometimes under our voluntary control. However, as with the 
previous cases, 5 and 6 look more like situations where the agent is 
voluntarily causing the forming of a belief than situations where he 
voluntarily forms one.  
In both cases, Mark could have avoided being epistemically 
irresponsible. He could have examined the evidence in a more skillful 
way. In 5, he could have decided to consider what was in fact a 
plausible possibility. In 6, he could have refrained from taking 
seriously an implausible possibility. What would have happened if he 
had done that? In 5, he would have seen that there was no juice left. 
In 6, he would have realized the implausibility of his team coming 
back. As a consequence of realizing those two states of affairs, no 
doubt Mark would have formed the belief that there was no more 
juice in 5, and that his team would loose in 6. So in this description, 
Mark could have done something voluntarily that would have caused 
himself to form certain beliefs. If he had (voluntarily) chosen to be 
more careful, different beliefs would have followed (involuntarily). 
Just like you can cause yourself to form the belief that the lights are 
on by turning them on, Mark could have caused himself to believe 
that there is no more juice, and that his team will loose if he had been 
more skilful at considering his evidence. Therefore, both 5 and 6 
appear to be cases of (A), and none of them falsifies (2**). 
Since all six cases can plausibly be described as cases of causing 
the forming of a belief, it follows that they are all merely refuting (2*), 
and not (2**). Therefore, neither Ginet’s nor Weatherson’s examples 
refute ADI**. Given my claim that being an objection against ADI** 
is the criterion for being a good objection against ADI, they also fail 









In the preceding section, I examined the voluntarist arguments of 
two authors, which consisted in the presentation of putative counter-
examples to (2). I claimed that these attempts failed because they did 
not meet the criterion for a good objection against ADI. Of course, I 
am not claiming that the failure of Ginet’s and Weatherson’s counter-
examples entails that the voluntarist strategy could not possibly work. 
However, I want to make the weaker claim that the voluntarist 
strategy does not seem promising. If we accept what I said so far, 
voluntarism appears to be very hard to vindicate, and is therefore not 
showing any sign of future success.  
As I mentioned earlier, given the distinction I introduced between 
(A) and (B), the voluntarist strategy against ADI can be interpreted as 
the rejection of either (2*) or (2**). I argued that the former 
interpretation cannot be right because it would merely refute ADI*, 
and ADI* is too trivially false to be what ADI means. Therefore, I 
concluded that the voluntarist strategy could only be successful in 
refuting ADI if it falsified (2**). So either (2**) is false, or 
voluntarism is false. Either we show that (B) – voluntarily forming 
beliefs – is possible, or we give up voluntarism. But given what I said 
so far, voluntarism seems to be very hard to defend. The deeply 
counter-intuitive character of cases like the second lights example is 
compelling. It shows in a clear way the intuitive plausibility of (2**). 
Moreover, the failure of the examples of Ginet and Weatherson 
illustrates how difficult it is to come up with a convincing example 
showing that it is possible to (B) voluntarily form a belief. Falsifying 
(2**) thus appears to be a very difficult task. From all that, it is hard 
not to infer that (2**) simply is what ADI is right about. But it would 
be rash to conclude that providing an example of (B) could never be 
done, and that voluntarism could not possibly be true. I do not have 
an argument supporting that strong claim. 
However, I think the moral of my story is that deontologists 
should look elsewhere for an answer to ADI. My analysis of premise 
(2) shows that doxastic involuntarism is much harder to falsify than it 
first seems. It turns out to require a very strong form of voluntarism 




examples of (B) could be found, but it seems unlikely. Given the 
plausibility of (2**) and the failure of the two voluntarist attempts, 
voluntarism does not seem promising. Therefore, it would be more 
fruitful for deontologists to look for a different strategy against ADI 
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